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Article
The Political Barriers to a National RPS
DAVID B. SPENCE
A national renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”) represents one way
to move the American economy toward cleaner sources of energy. By
requiring electricity providers to secure a specified percentage of their
power from renewable sources, a national RPS would replace some fossilfueled power with cleaner power from solar, wind, biomass, and other
renewable energy sources. As such, it represents one tool policy makers
can use to reduce American emissions of greenhouse gases, which drive
climate change. At the same time, a national RPS imposes its own costs—
costs that make passage of a national RPS politically difficult. Renewable
energy sources are, generally speaking, more expensive than conventional
sources, meaning that increased reliance upon renewables implies higher
electricity rates. While those higher rates will fall on today’s voters, many
of the benefits of using renewable power will accrue to future generations
and to people living outside of the United States. In addition, some parts
of the country are blessed with more renewable energy potential than
others, meaning that the national standard would impose more costs on
some regions than others. This Article examines why these issues make
supporting a national RPS politically risky and difficult for members of
Congress.
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The Political Barriers to a National RPS
DAVID B. SPENCE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thomas Edison famously predicted that man would one day “harness
the rise and fall of the tides and imprison the rays of the sun.”1 Indeed,
shortly before his death he told his friend Henry Ford, “I’d put my money
on the sun and solar energy. What a source of power! I hope we don’t
have to wait till oil and coal run out before we tackle that.”2 As Professor
Lincoln L. Davies demonstrates in his comprehensive and engaging article
advocating a national renewable portfolio standard (“RPS”), we have been
promoting renewable energy for several decades now, though our efforts to
date have been halting and fragmented.3 We have beaten Edison’s
deadline in that we are “tackling” renewables issues while we continue to
rely heavily on oil and coal; yet one imagines that Edison would be
frustrated with the relative lack of progress we have made toward the goal
of harnessing the power of the tides and the sun after all this time.
Professor Davies’ article provides a number of valuable contributions
to our understanding of renewables and energy policy. First, his survey of
state RPSs provides a comprehensive picture of state efforts, one that we
would not have but for his analysis of existing state policies. Second,
Professor Davies’ evaluation of those state standards shines a light on
some of their important defects, including the way some disguise their low
aspirations, fragment renewable energy credit (“REC”) markets,4 and flout
the Dormant Commerce Clause.5 Finally, and most importantly, Professor
Davies makes a strong practical and philosophical argument for a national
RPS, one that makes good sense.
My primary criticism of his argument, however, is that it disposes of
counterarguments a little too easily, particularly those arguments whose
political resonance might explain why a national RPS has eluded us despite
years of effort. Indeed, Professor Davies’ case seems to belie a kind of
* Associate Professor of Law, Politics & Regulation, McCombs School of Business, University
of Texas at Austin.
1
ANNA SPROULE, THOMAS A. EDISON: THE WORLD’S GREATEST INVENTOR 60 (2000).
2
JAMES D. NEWTON, UNCOMMON FRIENDS: LIFE WITH THOMAS EDISON, HENRY FORD, HARVEY
FIRESTONE, ALEXIS CARREL & CHARLES LINDBERGH 31 (1987).
3
Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339,
1339 (2010).
4
Id. at 1376–79.
5
Id. at 1368.
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surprise or frustration with arguments against a national RPS. This may be
a byproduct of his contention that the current debate over a national RPS
has lost its focus. Since more than thirty states have created their own
RPSs, says Davies, we ought not to be discussing the merits of the RPS as
a policy instrument, but rather whether a federal standard is preferable to
the system of state standards we now have.6 There are, however, very real
political impediments to the goal of enacting a national RPS, and, to my
reading at least, Professor Davies does not give all of the opposing
interests and arguments their full due. I share Professor Davies’ preference
for a national RPS, but a national RPS requires congressional action that
will only be forthcoming if a majority of legislators decide that a national
RPS serves their interests. Those interests, in turn, are related (but not
necessarily identical) to voters’ interests or the national interest.
II. THE CASE FOR INTEGRATION
Professor Davies’ case for a national RPS is an argument for a better
integrated policy, in two respects. First, he seeks to integrate energy law
and environmental law. Second, he seeks an integrated, national market
for RECs that is driven by a national RPS. This Part addresses both
arguments in turn, before turning to the legislative politics of a national
RPS in Part III.
A. The Energy and Environmental Law Contexts
Professor Davies begins with the observation that energy law and
environmental law are related in important ways and argues that it is
necessary to understand each in the presence of the other. Both legal
regimes regulate many of the same actors, but for reasons Davies explains
nicely, they sometimes work at cross purposes to one another.
Environmental law seeks to internalize pollution costs, thereby making the
production of energy more costly and the price higher. Energy regulation,
by contrast, seeks efficient pricing, toward which end regulators often
focus on controlling market power so as to keep prices down. As Professor
Davies notes, this is an artifact of both traditional energy regulation and the
bumpy road to competitive markets.7 Davies summarizes the evolution of
electricity markets over the last thirty years, a period during which
wholesale markets and some retail markets (those in a minority of states)
moved from traditional public utility regulation and administrative price-

6

Id. at 1342–45.
Id. at 1391–92. For more detailed treatment of the regulation of market power after
restructuring, see David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 765, 779–82 (2008).
7
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setting to competition and market pricing. In states where retail service is
provided by the licensed monopoly, the public utility commission sets rates
with an eye toward guarding against monopoly pricing. In wholesale
markets and competitive retail markets, regulators fear a repeat of the
California energy crisis of 2000–01, and remain on the lookout for
evidence of market power in the form of high prices.9
Meanwhile, the last three decades have also seen a transformation of
the environmental regulatory landscape. I am referring not so much to the
movement toward market-based regulatory instruments that Professor
Davies describes. Rather, I am referring to the imposition of increasingly
broad and stringent regulatory requirements on fossil-fueled power plants,
which have reduced emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides,
particulate matter, and mercury from those sources. The 1990 amendments
to the Clean Air Act10 created the so-called “acid rain program,” which
imposed additional sulfur dioxide regulation on previously grandfathered
coal-fired power plants through the first national marketable permit
program in the United States.11 Just as importantly, litigation has, over
several decades, extended most of the rest of the Clean Air Act regulatory

8
Professor Davies states that retail competition is “moribund,” and that the benefits of
competition may therefore never “reach fully down to the everyday consumer.” Davies, supra note 3,
at 1353–54. This seems to me an overstatement. The spread of retail competition has stopped, and a
few states have returned from competition to traditional regulation. Retail competition, however,
remains the norm in a significant minority of states. See KENNETH ROSE & KARL MEEUSEN, 2005
PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF ELECTRIC POWER MARKETS: UPDATE AND PERSPECTIVE 34 (2005),
available at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/reports/2005_rose.pdf (reporting that sixteen states and
the District of Columbia allow retail access to electricity markets). Indeed, some retail markets are
reputed to be running fairly well. See, e.g., L. Lynne Kiesling & Andrew N. Kleit, Introduction to
ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING: THE TEXAS STORY 1, 1–2 (L. Lynne Kiesling & Andrew N. Kleit eds.,
2009) (discussing Texas’s move to a retail market).
9
Davies, supra note 3, at 1354–55; see also FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, FINAL
REPORT ON PRICE MANIPULATION IN WESTERN MARKETS: FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION OF
POTENTIAL MANIPULATION OF ELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS PRICES, at ES-1 (2003), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/rev-chron.asp (concluding that “large-volume,
rapid-fire trading by a single company, in what was incorrectly assumed to be a liquid market,
substantially increased natural gas prices in California”); FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, THE
WESTERN ENERGY CRISIS, THE ENRON BANKRUPTCY, AND FERC’S RESPONSE 2 (2005), available at
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/chron/chronology.pdf (chronicling the “major
Commission actions during and following the Western energy crisis and Enron’s collapse”); Spence,
Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, supra note 7, at 779–81 (discussing market regulation
efforts in the wake of the California energy crisis).
10
42 U.S.C. § 7612 (2006).
11
Marketable permit programs usually involve the auctioning or free distribution of rights to
pollute, rights which can be sold to or purchased from others. Such programs can achieve reductions in
overall pollution levels by reducing the number of permits auctioned or distributed each year.
Marketable permit systems reduce compliance costs (compared with traditional permitting) because the
polluters that can reduce pollution least expensively will bear the lion’s share of the pollution reduction
obligation. For a good summary of marketable permit programs in the United States, see U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, National Center for Environmental Economics, Trading and
Marketable Permits, http://www.epa.gov/ (search “5.6. Trading and Marketable Permits”) (last visited
June 11, 2010).
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scheme to those grandfathered plants. The 1990 amendments also paved
the way for the regulation of toxic mercury emissions from coal-fired
power plants, though that process was slowed considerably by litigation
and political change.13
Yet despite these developments, Americans continue to rely heavily on
fossil-fueled power. Despite its growing regulatory burden, coal remains
the dominant source of electric power in the United States, comprising
about one-third of our total annual electric generation.14 We can conceive
of RPSs as a response to this state of affairs. As Professor Davies notes,
state RPS programs date back to the 1980s, but they have spread fairly
rapidly since.15 Indeed, some of the states that restructured their retail
electric markets preserved or imposed an RPS as part of their restructuring
plans, in response to concerns that a competitive generation market would
favor coal.16 As Professor Davies notes, these state RPS programs can be
credited with much of the growth we have seen in renewable technologies;
as a consequence, in percentage terms, some renewable sources (e.g.,
wind) are growing faster than coal-fired generation. Renewables, however,
started from a very small base.
In 2008, renewables, including
hydroelectric power, constituted about 9.3% of American electric
generation, about two-thirds of which was hydroelectric power.17 In fact,
the lion’s share of growth in electric generating capacity since the 1970s
has been taken by natural gas-fired plants,18 which are relatively
12
Not only have standards for air emissions from coal-fired power plants grown more stringent
over time, a series of legislative and regulatory developments have extended their coverage to older,
previously grandfathered, coal-fired power plants, and oil refineries. For a summary of the decadeslong legal battles over this so-called “new source review” issue, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL.,
ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed., forthcoming 2010)
(manuscript at 216–21, on file with author), and David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured
Electricity Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 193–99 (2005). In Environmental Defense v.
Duke Energy Corp., the Supreme Court affirmed the EPA’s discretion to apply (more stringent) new
source standards to older plants on which earlier repair work was done, permitting the plant to operate
longer, thereby emitting more pollution annually. 549 U.S. 561, 565–68 (2007).
13
See BOSSELMAN ET AL., supra note 12. In New Jersey v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit overturned the
Bush administration’s relatively lenient approach to regulating mercury emissions from coal-fired
plants. 517 F.3d 574, 577–78 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
14
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, at 18 (2010),
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf [hereinafter EIA, ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 2008]. Across the individual American states, there is great variety in their generation mixes.
Some states relied on coal for as much as ninety percent of their generating capacity; others have little
or no coal-fired capacity. See, e.g., ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE
ELECTRICITY PROFILES 2007, at 25–30, 103–08 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/
electricity/st_profiles/sep2007.pdf (profiling the energy use of California and Kentucky).
15
Davies, supra note 3, at 1341–42.
16
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 3210 (2009) (Maine’s restructuring law); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 704.7821 (West 2009), amended by S. 358, 2009 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009) and
Assem. 387, 2009 Leg., 75th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2009) (Nevada’s restructuring law); see also Spence,
Coal-Fired Power, supra note 12, at 199–202 (discussing the effects of market restructuring and
regulation on pollution from coal combustion).
17
EIA, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2008, supra note 14, at 2.
18
Spence, Coal-Fired Power, supra note 12, at 214–15.
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inexpensive to build, produce fewer pollutants per unit of energy produced
than coal, and have benefited from advances in turbine design that have
driven down costs.19 Moreover, while renewables can compete on price in
a few places, fossil-fueled power plants seem likely to retain their cost
advantages even in the face of more stringent regulation of emissions of
sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, and mercury. As described
below, however, that advantage is less clear when we add greenhouse gas
controls.
Professor Davies recognizes a kind of complementarity between the
respective movements toward market-based regulation in environmental
law and toward competition in energy law. He argues that an RPS
“merges” energy and environmental law so that they do not undermine one
another.20 In a conceptual sense, that may be true, but only at the margins.
Certainly an RPS provides environmental benefits by promoting particular
energy sources. It does so, however, not by way of some merger of two
kinds of market-based regulation; rather, it is a mandate. It requires
retailers who might otherwise generate or acquire power elsewhere to get
some of it from renewable sources. While states may have the right to
approve construction of power plants, an RPS goes one step further,
specifying the use of particular sources of power. If an RPS permits
compliance by purchasing RECs, the mandate can be satisfied in part using
a market for RECs, that is, retailers may either generate renewable power
or buy RECs.21 But it is a mandate nevertheless, one that constrains
choice. A national RPS may be a good idea, but I do not share Professor
Davies’ sense that it represents (or will trigger) a broader integration of
environmental and energy law, let alone one that embraces markets.
In fact, the move to competition in the electricity industry has, in some
ways, made the world less hospitable for renewables. When electric
utilities were vertically integrated operations, and investors could count on
a guaranteed return on investment (through cost of service ratemaking),
investment in a power plant or a transmission line was a much less risky
venture. The owner of the grid was also the owner of most or all of the
generation of the system, and the owner did not need to worry about
competition from yet-to-be-built plants, or whether there would be
adequate transmission to get the power to customers. That is no longer the
case. Prospective investors in renewable and nonrenewable plants alike
must worry about competition. A national RPS would provide a
guaranteed market to renewable plants, but does not ensure that any
particular plant will find a customer. Nor does it guarantee that the owner
19
For a more detailed comparison of the cost and environmental attributes of natural gas and
other electric generating technologies, see infra Part III.B.1–2.
20
Davies, supra note 3, at 1344.
21
Id. at 1359–60.
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of the generating plant will be able to get his power to customers. For that,
the owner needs a connection to the grid.
Restructuring of electricity markets has brought competition to
wholesale markets, but it has also strained the electric grid by drastically
increasing the number and volume of arms-length wholesale electricity
sales. More energy is traveling longer distances over the grid than ever
before, and investment in new transmission capacity is not keeping pace
with demand. To the extent that RPSs provide incentives for construction
of central station renewables, such as wind farms or concentrated solar
plants, those facilities are likely to be located far from the customers they
will serve. This will put additional strain on the electric grid, and we are
already seeing disputes over who should pay for the extension of
transmission lines to renewable generation plants located far from load.22
This is primarily a cost allocation issue and does not undermine Professor
Davies’ case for a national RPS, but it does go to the question of the
magnitude of the benefits of an RPS.
Similarly, I think that Professor Davies overstates his case when he
argues that increased reliance on renewable power will increase system
reliability by diversifying the generation mix. In places where wind and
solar offer a cost-competitive alternative to natural gas, their presence may
act as a hedge against rising gas prices. Wind and solar, however, face
another reliability problem: intermittency. Davies acknowledges this
problem, but he does not offer a persuasive rejoinder to it. Wind turbines
provide power to the grid only when the wind blows. Solar stations
provide power to the grid only when the sun shines. Some critics of
renewables argue that grid operators must therefore keep fossil fuel plants
on spinning reserves (running and ready to provide power to the grid) in
case the wind stops blowing or the sun stops shining.23 These reliability

22

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) Chairman Jon Wellinghoff discussed these
issues in testimony before Congress last year:
FERC also has approved rates to fund the development of transmission facilities
needed for renewable resources. . . . Last year, the Commission addressed the delays
of Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators
(ISOs) in processing the requests of planned generation projects to interconnect with
the electric grid. Many of these projects are wind projects. . . . A significant
expansion of renewable resources in our electricity supply portfolio will impose
other stresses on the electric grid, requiring additional high-voltage transmission
facilities, network upgrades, and feeder lines. It is highly unlikely that the
transmission facilities necessary to deliver the output of these renewable resources
will be constructed without additional federal planning, siting, and cost allocation
authority.
Climate Change and Clean Energy: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Jon Wellinghoff, Chairman, FERC).
23
James Schlesinger & Robert. L. Hirsch, Opinion, Getting Real on Wind and Solar, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Apr. 24, 2009.
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claims are sometimes overstated; for example, recent generations of wind
turbines are much less sensitive to changes in wind speeds, and they are
thus able to generate more reliable power from variable wind conditions,
than their ancestors.25 Concerns about intermittency, however, are not
wholly without merit. In most locations, renewable power is not as
reliable as fossil-fueled power, and this is especially true as we move from
the best renewable plant locations (which are being taken) toward secondbest locations. Therefore, as renewable generation is deployed, it will not
displace fossil-fueled power on a megawatt-to-megawatt basis, unless and
until we develop the capacity to store electric energy in larger quantities.
While a great deal of research energy is being devoted to this problem,26
commercially viable alternatives that solve the intermittency dilemma
remain unavailable.
Nevertheless, some political momentum for a “transition to a
sustainably fueled society”27 remains, thanks to the rise of climate change
as a front burner issue. As Professor Davies notes, fossil-fueled power
plants continue to shift to society the costs associated with greenhouse gas
emissions, including costs associated with climate change.28 Scientific
concern over the effects of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases is
not new: the leading scientific organization for the study of global
warming and climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”), was created more than two decades ago.29 Within the
last half-decade, however, the world’s climatologists have concluded that
human activity—emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases30—is “very likely” hastening global warming.31 Global mean
24
In some places and at some times, the wind blows and the sun shines quite reliably. In the
Southwest, solar power is fairly reliable and generates the most power during periods of peak demand
(late afternoons).
25
Leland E. Teschler, Green Technology: Inside an Advanced Wind Turbine, MACHINE DESIGN,
June 5, 2008, http://machinedesign.com/article/green-technology-inside-an-advanced-wind-turbine0605.
26
Some analysts have suggested that energy from renewable stations can be stored in the form of
compressed air or using flywheels. Neither these technologies, nor battery technology, have developed
sufficiently to present a solution to the electricity storage problem. For a summary of the technical
aspects of electricity storage, see National Renewable Energy Laboratory, Energy Storage Basics,
http://www.nrel.gov/learning/eds_energy_storage.html (last visited June 8, 2010).
27
This, says Professor Davies, is the core objective of the RPS. Davies, supra note 3, at 1358.
28
See id. at 1370–71 (analyzing the ability of a national RPS to eliminate the “social costs
associated with the mining, processing, transportation, combustion, and clean-up of fossil and nuclear
fuels” (quoting Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got It Wrong: The Case for a
National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y
J. 85, 127 (2008))).
29
The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Program. For a brief description
of the panel’s history, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, History, http://www.ipcc.ch/
organization/organization_history.htm (last visited June 8, 2010).
30
The primary greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, and various fluorocarbon
compounds. Molecules of these gases tend to trap more solar radiation in the atmosphere than do other
air molecules. While most of these other gases trap more heat than carbon dioxide on a molecule-by-
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temperatures are behaving consistently with the models produced by
climatologists,32 and the effects projected by these models (including
unprecedented shrinking of polar ice caps) are happening. As a result of
human activity, greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere have
increased from their preindustrial level of 280 parts per million (“ppm”) to
their current level of just under 380 ppm.33 While there is much less
agreement over the nature and distribution of the effects of warming,
concern about the worst-case scenario has motivated calls for changes in
the way the world produces and uses energy. Because greenhouse gases
dissipate slowly in the atmosphere, today’s emissions will have warming
effects for many years to come. Over the last decade, climatologists and a
majority of the world’s political leaders have concluded that growth in
greenhouse gas emissions ought to be managed so as to limit them to a
maximum concentration of 450 ppm or lower, in order to minimize the
probability of catastrophic effects.34 All of this seems to offer support for
state RPS programs, the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, and,
perhaps, a national RPS. The question, then, is which combination of these
regulatory approaches makes the most sense?
B. Analysis of State RPS: Politics Matters
Professor Davies makes a strong case for the superiority of a federal
RPS over a series of state RPSs, and his insightful and comprehensive
exploration of state RPS programs reveals some important problems with
the state-by-state approach. He evaluates each existing state RPS’s
effectiveness (or “efficacy tendency”) by scoring each on four dimensions.
Three of his four dimensions shine a light on the role domestic politics
plays in state RPS policy.
The first criterion, “aspirational
aggressiveness,” focuses on the question of whether the standard is
voluntary or mandatory. The second criterion, which he calls “salience
distortion,” focuses on the extent to which the state RPS does what it
claims to do. His fourth criterion, “enforcement rigor,” assesses the
molecule basis, carbon dioxide volumes in the atmosphere dwarf those of the other gases, making it the
focus of most of the regulatory and policy attention.
31
Summary for Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS,
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 3 (2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg1_report_the_physical_science
_basis.htm.
32
According to the IPCC, “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow
and ice, and rising global average sea level.” Id. at 5.
33
Id. at 2.
34
See, e.g., Michael Oppenheimer & Annie Petsonk, Article 2 of the UNFCC: Historical Origins,
Recent Interpretations, 73 CLIMACTIC CHANGE 195, 205–11 (2005) (discussing potential consequences
of elevated CO2 levels).
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stringency of (de facto) penalties for noncompliance. Taken together,
these criteria separate state programs that are truly action-forcing from
those that are mere window dressing. If a state RPS is voluntary, or if
penalties for noncompliance are less than the benefits of noncompliance,
we cannot expect the RPS to affect behavior. Likewise, if the renewable
capacity would have been built without the RPS, the RPS does not advance
the goal of transitioning to a post-fossil-fueled economy. But these weak
or toothless “standards” have political value: they let politicians take credit
for symbolic action without imposing costs on influential constituents.
For example, the early versions of Texas’s RPS were certainly not
terribly ambitious. Thanks to favorable conditions for wind-based
generation in west Texas (and subsidies, such as the production tax credit),
wind capacity in west Texas developed rapidly, exceeding some of the
state RPS goals before they took effect.36 Similarly, one cannot compare
the aggressiveness of state targets merely by looking at the numerical
targets themselves. In 1999, the State of Maine established a renewable
electricity target of thirty percent; however, Maine includes its ample
existing hydroelectric resources within its definition of renewable power,
making the thirty percent goal seem much less ambitious.37 On the other
hand, some state RPSs have high aspirations and do set mandatory
standards for renewable electricity that the market seems unlikely to meet
on its own. Distinguishing the action-forcing RPSs from those that
represent mere symbolic action is difficult, and Professor Davies’ look
behind the numbers is a welcome addition to our understanding and
comparison of state RPSs.
Professor Davies’ remaining criterion for evaluating state RPSs—
“market definition”—identifies another problem that we can chalk up to
state politics, namely, the tendency of legislators to build protectionist
elements into RPSs, elements that may be unconstitutional. The Dormant

35

Davies, supra note 3, at 1360–62.
RYAN WISER & OLE LANGNISS, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., THE RENEWABLES
PORTFOLIO STANDARD IN TEXAS: AN EARLY ASSESSMENT 11 (2001), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/
EA/EMP/reports/49107.pdf. Wiser and Langniss note:
That the initial RPS targets are to be exceeded may therefore come as little surprise:
wind power in Texas, with the PTC, is close to competing on purely economic
grounds against new natural gas facilities, even with relatively low natural gas
prices. With early over-compliance with the purchase standard and compliance
costs that are at low levels given the competitive pricing offered by renewable
generators, there have been calls for increasing the policy’s renewable electric
capacity goals.
Id.
37
Id. at 16. Maine subsequently added a ten percent non-hydro requirement to its RPS to address
this deficiency. See DSIRE: Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, Maine:
Incentives/Policies for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?
Incentive_Code=ME01R&state=ME&CurrentPageID=1 (last visited June 7, 2010).
36
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Commerce Clause places strict limits on the ability of states to impede
interstate commerce. Professor Davies states that “a number of state RPSs
favor in-state renewable resources,” either by giving more credit (toward
reaching the mandated target) for using power from in-state renewable
generators than out-of-state generators or by directly limiting credit for
imported renewable power.39 Some of these forms of favoritism are almost
certainly unconstitutional.40 This sort of intentional impediment to the
operation of interstate markets for renewable electricity, combined with the
absence of a uniform definition of renewables and limits on the tradability
of RECs are among the strongest parts of Professor Davies’ argument for a
national standard. Trading enables those who can provide renewable
power at the least cost to bear more of the burden of meeting RPS goals,
but tradable emissions permit markets require liquidity in order to work
well.41 Restricting the REC market geographically limits buyers’ access to
low-price REC generators. Therefore, a national market for RECs has a
much better chance of reducing the costs of complying with an RPS in
significant ways.
Thus, Professor Davies is exactly right when he says that if RECs are
not tradable across state lines (either because different states define the
credits differently or because cross-border trades are prohibited), REC
markets will do a much poorer job of reducing compliance costs42—all of
which suggests that a national RPS ought to do the work of the fifty state
RPSs much more efficiently.
III. POLITICS: THE PROSPECTS FOR A “REPUBLICAN MOMENT”
Of course, the creation of a national RPS requires congressional action,
which means garnering the support of a majority of both the House and the
Senate. Professor Davies is fully aware of this, and he offers some
convincing rebuttals to the arguments that political opponents raise in
opposition to a national RPS. His rejoinder to the argument that an RPS
gives renewables an unfair advantage in the market is a strong one. He
38
Of course, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Since the 1824 case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), Supreme Court jurisprudence has interpreted the Commerce Clause to imply
limits on state regulation of interstate commerce. For a good summary of Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and its applicability to state RPSs, see Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable
Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 265–74
(2008).
39
Davies, supra note 3, at 1368.
40
See Endrud, supra note 38, at 270–74.
41
For a discussion of the importance of liquidity in emissions markets, see Christopher S.
Hooper, Student Article, Limiting the Use of Emissions Allowances: A Statutory Analysis of Title IV of
the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 566, 599 (1996).
42
Davies, supra note 3, at 1379–80.
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notes that traditional fuels have long enjoyed their own policy advantages
(including subsidies of one kind or another) not given to other fuels,43 and
that fossil fuels have benefited from the ability to shift some of their costs
(in the form of pollution) to society. These costs may not be easy to
monetize, but they are real and substantial nevertheless. Professor Davies
also has an answer to the objections of legislators representing states with
low renewable generation potential (i.e., states with few wind, solar, or
other renewable resources). It is true, he notes, that a national RPS will
force a geographic transfer of wealth, but so do most regulatory
programs.44
Why, then, have members of Congress not recognized the wisdom of
the case for a national RPS? It cannot be simply that entrenched business
interests are holding this good idea hostage. We know from experience
that such interests can be overcome.
The history of American
environmental law has witnessed so-called “republican moments”—
instances in which the broad interest in environmental protection has
overcome entrenched local interests to produce national legislative
victories.45 If the public interest is compelling enough, it can overcome
even powerful resistance. Congress passed the Clean Air Act, Clean Water
Act, and other major environmental statutes over the initial objections of
industry, in part because the public demanded it.46 Can we depend upon
reasoned arguments to overcome local interests in the case of a national
RPS in much the same way they did in the case of the Clean Air Act or the
Clean Water Act? I think not, because the politics of a national RPS are
different, and more difficult, in several important ways.
A. Electoral Effects and Regulatory Legislation
It is commonplace in analyses of congressional behavior to begin with
the following generally accepted premises. The first is that members of
Congress are motivated by a mix of goals, but the desire to be reelected is
preeminent among them.47 Thus, legislators may seek particular policy
43

Id. at 1358–59.
Id. at 1367.
45
This idea comes from James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular
Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 311–13 (1990); see also Daniel
A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66–67 (1992)
(adapting the idea of republican moments to environmental politics).
46
For a lengthier discussion of the political logic of republican moments, see Farber, supra note
45, at 66–67; Christopher H. Schroeder, Rational Choice vs. Republican Moment—Explanations for
Environmental Laws, 1969–1973, 9 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 29, 31, 45–46 (1998). For a rational
choice explanation of republican moments, see David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism,
Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 429–32, 436 (2002).
47
This is the working assumption of most congressional scholars in political science. For the
often-credited best argument of this working assumption, see DAVID MAHYEW, CONGRESS: THE
ELECTORAL CONNECTION 14–17 (1974).
44
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goals, prestige, career advancement within the institution, and more;
however, in order to accomplish any of these goals, a legislator must
remain in office.48 Hence, reelection is the overriding goal. The second
premise is that most voters are rationally ignorant, that is, they remain
relatively uninformed about most policy decisions.49 It is rational for
voters to be relatively less informed about policy choices because they lack
the time, the resources, and (sometimes) the inclination to become fully
informed. Instead, they delegate the process of making informed decisions
to their elected representatives. From these two propositions we can
deduce some important conclusions about how individual legislators make
policy choices.
Calculations of the electoral risk associated with different courses of
action will drive the initial stages of the legislator’s decisionmaking
process. Thus, for each policy choice a legislator faces, she must try to
anticipate the electoral risk of her action alternatives.50 That calculation, in
turn, will depend upon several factors:
1. The electoral vulnerability of the legislator (the safety
of the legislator’s seat and the reservoir of trust, or
“leeway,”51 the legislator has developed among her reelection
constituency).
2. “The legislator’s perception of how salient the issue is
to voters, and how likely it is that voters will become aware
of the legislator’s choice . . . .”52
3. The traceability of the consequences of the vote, both
negative (the risk of blame) and positive (the ability to claim
credit),53 which in turn is partly a function of the issue’s
salience and other factors.54

48

Id. at 16.
Economist Anthony Downs is credited with popularizing this notion. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 246 (1957).
50
R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 14–15 (1990); WILLIAM T.
BIANCO, TRUST: REPRESENTATIVES AND CONSTITUENTS 14–16 (1994); MORRIS P. FIORINA,
RETROSPECTIVE VOTING IN AMERICAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 11 (1981). Arnold notes that a vote can
rouse the “inattentive public,” a risk to which legislators must constantly attend. ARNOLD, supra, at
68–70.
51
BIANCO, supra note 50, at 22–24.
52
See Spence, A Public Choice, supra note 46, at 423 & n.114; see also BIANCO, supra note 50,
at 14–15.
53
See ARNOLD, supra note 50, at 47–51; RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE: HOUSE
MEMBERS IN THEIR DISTRICTS 137–41 (1978).
54
Other factors might include the extent to which the public will associate an adverse outcome
with the legislator’s vote. See ARNOLD, supra note 50, at 48–49 (positing that traceability requires a
visible individual contribution by the legislator); FIORINA, supra note 50, at 5–6 (arguing that citizens
“know what life has been like during the incumbent’s administration” and need not know what the
actual policies entail in order to “see or feel the results of those policies”).
49
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4. “The legislator’s perception of voters’ preference
intensity—that is, the importance of the issue to voters
relative to other issues on which the legislator has taken a
position.”55
Consider how these factors work together to produce legislative
decisions that may or may not represent the opinions of the median voter.56
If an issue is not salient to most voters, the legislator’s seat is electorally
“safe,” and/or the consequences of the decision will not be traceable to the
legislator, she may feel free to deviate from her median constituent’s
preferences. That is, she may pursue her electoral goals by choosing
policies that serve the interests of a minority for whom the issue is
particularly salient or important, at the expense of the majority of her
constituents’ preferences.57
Social scientists have long argued that wealthy individuals and
business groups exert disproportionate influence over the policy process in
this very way. Speaking long ago about the role of interest group pressure
in the policy process, political scientist E.E. Schattschneider stated, “The
flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong
upper-class accent. Probably about 90 percent of the people cannot get
into the pressure system.”58 Economist Mancur Olson, Jr. offered a logical
explanation for this perception, arguing that small, organized groups face
fewer transaction costs when organizing and have more at stake and more
to gain from organizing to pressure government;59 hence, they will have an
easier time being heard by government officials.60 When legislators attend
to the interests of these highly motivated, better informed minorities,
Congress will produce decisions consistent with the fully informed

55

Spence, A Public Choice, supra note 46, at 424. “Even when an issue is salient or the
legislator’s seat is not safe, constituents might not care deeply enough about the issue to change their
votes,” compared with other issues. Id. at 424 n.115.
56
If each voter’s preferences over a range of possible policy choices can be arranged on a
dimension (say, from liberal to conservative, or left to right), half of the voters’ preferences will lie to
the left of the median voter’s preferred outcome, and half will lie to the right.
57
Political scientist Richard Fenno distinguishes between the representative’s “geographical
constituency” and his or her “reelection constituency.” FENNO, supra note 53, at 1–11.
58
E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 35 (1960). Schattschneider was arguing from the premise that voters exerted influence
through group pressure, and that the most voters did not belong to an influential pressure group.
59
MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY
OF GROUPS 141–46 (1965). Olson’s work gave birth to a huge literature that conceptualized interest
group activity and the regulatory process as a prisoner’s dilemma game, one in which members of
groups representing diffuse interests have much more of a temptation to free ride than members of
groups representing tightly organized interests, further exacerbating the underrepresentation of nonbusiness interests. For two good post-Olsonian examinations of Olson’s ideas, see RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE ACTION 20–22 (1982), and TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION: THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 1–3 (1992).
60
OLSON, supra note 59, at 33–35.
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preferences of the median voter only if the preferences of those minorities
happen to correspond to those of the fully informed median voter.
Despite all these disadvantages, mass interests sometimes prevail. A
groundswell of support for environmental protection produced one major
piece of environmental legislation after another during the 1970s. These
“republican moments” benefited from changes during the 1960s in three of
the four elements of electoral risk outlined above. First, the growth of
mass media and popularization of the science of ecology61 helped make
environmental issues more salient to the general public. That is, people
learned more about the harm caused by environmental pollution. Second,
according to public opinion polling, people cared more about
environmental protection than ever before.62 Whether people always
preferred less pollution, by the late 1960s, they preferred it more strongly
than ever. Third, voters ascribed to Congress the power and responsibility
to remedy the problem, since neither states63 nor courts64 had been able to
do so. In this setting, members of Congress concluded that it was to their
political advantage to respond to this groundswell. Can the same sort of
groundswell produce a national RPS today?
B. The Electoral Effects of a National RPS
The politics of the national RPS are similar to the politics of those
early environmental fights in some ways. Both involve proposals whose
benefits will be realized in the future, and most of whose costs will be
incurred now. Both involve proposals whose benefits will be spread
widely among all voters, and most of whose costs will be concentrated on a
powerful few industries. In both cases, the public seems to support
61

Rachel Carson’s seminal bestseller, Silent Spring, was probably the best known popularization
of the ecological framework. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
62
For a good summary of how the public mobilized to support environmental legislation in the
early 1970s, see Michael E. Kraft & Norman J. Vig, Environmental Policy from the 1970s to the 1990s:
Continuity and Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990S: TOWARD A NEW AGENDA 3, 3–29
(Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 2d ed. 1994).
63
For a summary of state and local efforts to regulate air emissions prior to the Clean Air Act, see
PETER S. MENELL & RICHARD B. STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 241–48 (1994).
64
Perhaps the quintessential example of the inability or unwillingness of courts to provide a
comprehensive solution to pollution problems is found in the New York Court of Appeals opinion in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870 (1970). The court refused to enjoin pollution from a
cement plant, noting:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of parties before
it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public
issues. . . . Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from
solution . . . . A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of private
litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial establishment is neither equipped in
the limited nature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air pollution. This is an area
beyond the circumference of one private lawsuit.
Id. at 871.
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legislative action. Depending upon how the question is worded, opinion
polls show widespread public concern over global warming and climate
change,65 a problem to which a national RPS offers a partial solution.
There are, however, also some important differences: characteristics of the
political economy of a national RPS that dim the prospects for a republican
moment in this case.
1. Direct Costs
Depending upon its stringency, a national RPS seems likely to impose
immediate costs that are greater than Professor Davies suggests. As a
preliminary matter, I agree with Professor Davies’ observation that the
costs of a national RPS are very difficult to estimate, and may include both
benefits (e.g., new jobs and price stability benefits of a diversified energy
mix) and costs (e.g., building transmission associated with renewable
plants) that are difficult to foresee, let alone quantify. I also agree that any
fair comparison of the costs of renewables with traditional sources ought to
include an estimate of the social and environmental costs of those
traditional sources. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the initial compliance
costs matters politically, and I think Davies overstates the probability that
immediate cost impacts of a national RPS will be small. It is axiomatic
that the rate impacts of a national RPS will be a function of the degree to
which the RPS forces real change in the energy mix. Citing a relatively
small number of studies that focus on existing state RPSs, Professor Davies
implies that price increases are not likely to exceed two cents per kilowatthour (“kWh”), an increase he calls small or moderate.66 These estimates
are consistent with those of the Energy Information Administration.67 This
mean effect, however, may belie widely varying effects in different parts
of the country; and in most places, two cents per kWh represents a fifteen
to thirty percent increase in electricity rates.
More importantly, if the studies Professor Davies cites include those
state RPSs that were more symbolic than action-forcing (less aspirational,
high on salience distortion, low on enforcement rigor, in Davies’
nomenclature), we would not expect to see much in the way of cost
impacts because those RPSs are not actually forcing change. By contrast,
if a national RPS will be action-forcing, it ought to have a larger impact on
electricity prices. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Green Power Network
65
While concern about global warming and climate change seems to be dampening rather than
increasing, it remains strong. See Lydia Saad, Increased Number Think Global Warming Is
“Exaggerated,” GALLUP, Mar. 11, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/116590/increased-number-thinkglobal-warming-exaggerated.aspx.
66
Davies, supra note 3, at 1384.
67
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, IMPACTS OF A 15-PERCENT RENEWABLE
PORTFOLIO STANDARD 8–10 (2007), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/prps/pdf/
sroiaf(2007)03.pdf.
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publishes an index of the premiums electric utilities charge for renewable
power in various states. While these data do not measure the overall cost
impacts of an RPS, they do seem to reflect a larger than two cents per kWh
premium for renewable power in some parts of the country.68 If members
of Congress suspect that their constituents are unwilling to pay even a two
cent per kWh increase, they are unlikely to support a national RPS.
2. Avoided Social Costs and “Traceability”
Professor Davies also overstates the benefits (avoided social costs) of
renewable power—at least those that are not associated with avoided
greenhouse gas emissions. Environmental regulation of coal and natural
gas is growing more stringent all the time. It has been a long time coming,
but the courts and the Obama administration have put environmental law
on track to drastically reduce some of the externalities associated with
fossil-fueled power, including the effects of surface coal mining69 and the
environmental costs of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, and
mercury emissions from fossil fuel combustion.70 This progress means that
RPSs (national or otherwise) cannot be credited with avoiding significant
quantities of those emissions, which in turn may reduce public pressure for
action.71
The largest quantifiable benefits of a national RPS would be the
greenhouse gas emissions avoided, as renewable sources displace fossil
fuel generators. The Clean Air Act has left untouched these emissions, and
coal- and gas-fired plants continue to emit carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases unabated. Legislators may rightly conclude, however,
68

U.S. Dep’t of Energy, The Green Power Network, Green Pricing: Utility Programs by State,
http://apps3.eere.energy.gov/greenpower/markets/pricing.shtml?page=1 (last visited June 8, 2010).
69
The controversial practice of mountaintop mining—removing the surface vegetation at the top
of the mountain and depositing it in valleys below—can wreak havoc on the environment. The Obama
administration is now applying the Clean Water Act in such a way as to drastically reduce the practice
of dumping fill material into streams and wetlands. On July 15, 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers
proposed changes in its so-called Nationwide Permit 21 to prohibit its use to authorize discharges of
dredged or fill material into waters of the United States for surface coal mining activities in the
Appalachian region. Suspension and Modification of Nationwide Permit 21, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,311
(proposed July 15, 2009).
70
See supra note 12. More recently, on February 6, 2009, the Obama EPA announced its
intention to promulgate rules regulating mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants as toxic
emissions under section 112 of the Clean Air Act. Steven D. Cook, EPA Plans Mercury Rules for
Power Plants, Moves To Withdraw Supreme Court Petition, 40 Env’t Rep. Cur. Dev. (BNA) No. 317
(Feb. 13, 2009). On June 3, 2010, the EPA announced its intention to tighten national ambient air
quality standards for sulfur dioxide. John M. Broder, E.P.A. Tightens Rule on Sulfur Dioxide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2010, at A18.
71
It is theoretically possible that these gains may be lost if the White House falls under the
control of an administration that wishes to reinstitute lax regulation of strip mining and coal-fired
combustion. It seems very unlikely, however, that a new administration would undo the settlements
reached with old coal-fired power plants and oil refineries providing for tougher pollution controls at
those facilities. Similarly, new rules governing disposal of spoil material at mining locations and
regulation of mercury emissions as a toxic pollutant will be difficult and costly to undo.
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that the costs of inaction (environmental harm) and benefits of action
(averted harm) on an RPS are far less traceable to their votes than the costs
of action (higher electric rates). In plain English, voters will see and feel
the costs of an RPS (in the form of electric rate increases) more directly
and immediately than they will see its benefits. While the economic costs
of climate change may be enormous, regardless of how much we discount
future impacts,72 they remain relatively uncertain and difficult to
understand for most voters. By contrast, when the Clean Air Act and
Clean Water Act were passed, voters could see (and smell) the harm that
the laws would avoid. The Santa Barbara oil spill, the Cuyahoga River
fire, the “death” of Lake Erie, and the smog that choked major urban areas
all represented tangible, immediate costs that voters wanted to avoid. Most
recently, the catastrophic oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon platform in
the Gulf of Mexico is certainly a high salience event, one that highlights
the costs of our dependence upon oil. It is possible that this crisis could
accelerate support for energy reform, including legislation containing a
national RPS. A national RPS would do relatively little, however, to ease
our dependence on oil, focusing as it does on sources of electricity.
Rather, the benefits of the national RPS code toward our dependence on
another fossil fuel: namely, coal. In other words, the effects of climate
change—receding polar ice caps and glaciers, and the threat of slowly
rising sea levels—are important; but they are not nearly as immediate to
most American voters. Moreover, climatologists do not agree on the
nature and distribution of the likely impacts of climate change, their
magnitude, and the degree to which humans will be able to adapt in ways
that minimize impacts, among other issues, further exacerbating the
traceability problem for legislators.73
In addition, since greenhouse gases persist in the atmosphere for fifty
years after being emitted, the benefits of action now will accrue not so
much to this generation or the next, but to the ones after that. In other
words, we will not see the benefits of a national RPS in ways that are easy
to measure or understand, nor will we see them in our lifetimes.
Atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations will continue to grow long
after we have reduced our emissions. Furthermore, in the absence of

72
For a review of the literature, see generally MICHAEL D. MASTRANDREA, CALCULATING THE
BENEFITS OF CLIMATE POLICY: EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS OF INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT MODELS
(2009), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/benefits-workshop/mastrandrea-calculating-benefitsof-climate-policy, and Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, The Economics of Climate Change
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper 06-06, 2006), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/
RFF-DP-06-06.pdf. Most estimates of the cost range from as low as a few dollars per ton of CO2 to as
high as $360 per ton of CO2. MASTRANDREA, supra, at 46–52.
73
See MASTRANDREA, supra note 72, at 30–35 (discussing the effect of assumptions about
adaptation on cost estimates).
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74

emissions reductions in China and India, those benefits may never be
realized. Even if one accepts the sensible rejoinder that the industrialized
world ought to be the first mover on this issue because it grew to wealth on
the back of uncontrolled fossil-fueled emissions,75 the nature of the
greenhouse effect is such that emissions reductions in the United States (or
Europe or anywhere) accrue to the benefit of the entire world. This is the
tragedy of the commons76 on its grandest (and, therefore, most powerful)
scale yet. While the Clean Air Act of 1970 benefited Canadians by
imposing emissions controls on American power plants,77 Congress knew
then that most of the benefits would accrue to Americans. Consequently,
legislators could take credit for addressing the problem, and for any
progress that could be traced back to those statutes. As it happened, the
Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act produced results relatively quickly:
each represents an enormous success story, having drastically reduced air
and water emissions in real terms, despite growth in population, economic
activity, and vehicle miles traveled since their passage.78 If Congress
enacts a national RPS or takes other steps to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, we will not see the same sort of easily identifiable benefits. It
may only be fair to future generations and to citizens of the world for the
United States to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions now, but it is very
difficult for members of Congress to enact legislation, the costs of which
fall entirely on their constituents, and most of the benefits of which fall
elsewhere and in the distant future.
The regional politics of a national RPS may also be about costs,
benefits, and traceability, at least on the surface. The argument that a
national RPS represents a wealth transfer from “renewable resource poor”
74
Of course, China and India are two of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases. As developing
countries, they were not obligated to reduce their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol. Since Kyoto,
negotiations over the next steps in combating climate change have broken down repeatedly over the
question of whether developing nations like China and India ought to commit to emissions reductions.
They have steadfastly refused to commit, which was a sticking point at the most recent negotiations in
Copenhagen in December 2009. John M. Broder, 5 Nations Forge Pact on Climate; Goals Go Unmet,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2009, at A1.
75
The developing world is currently at a point on its growth curve that the developed world was
at long before it began regulating air emissions from fossil fuel combustion. There is a strong
argument that it would be unfair for the United States to insist now that China forego the kind of
growth that the United States enjoyed—that is, growth based upon the exploitation of cheap energy
without regulations designed to internalize social and environmental costs. According to this argument,
at the very least, the United States ought to limit its own greenhouse gas emissions before it insists that
China do so.
76
See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968).
77
The United States was not aware of it at the time, but Europeans were to benefit from American
emissions reductions as well. We now know that some pollutants travel across the oceans to be
deposited on continents other than those from which they were emitted. COMM. ON THE SIGNIFICANCE
OF INT’L TRANSP. OF AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL SOURCES OF LOCAL
POLLUTION 1–8 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12743.
78
Robin Lloyd, Success Stories: Cleaning Up Planet Earth, LIVESCIENCE, Apr. 22, 2009,
http://www.livescience.com/environment/090422-earth-day-success.html.
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parts of the country (largely in the East) to “renewable resource rich” parts
of the country (the windy plains and coasts, and the sunny Southwest) may
be logically weak, as Professor Davies suggests.79 It is, however,
politically powerful. Davies is quite right that the status quo benefits states
that are blessed with natural deposits of fossil fuels or that chose to shift
environmental costs to the rest of us by burning those fuels.80 There is no
inherent justice in the status quo, and no inherent injustice in a policy
change that alters that status quo. Legislative politics, however, is not
always about justice. The fact remains that legislators from the
southeastern United States appear to see this policy change as a transfer of
wealth from their constituents to other parts of the country, and they
oppose it. As Professor Davies notes, their arguments ring a bit hollow for
another reason: even if the southeastern states cannot exploit solar and
wind resources, they have an ample supply of biomass, which qualifies as a
renewable resource under the national RPS provisions contained in the
Waxman-Markey bill.81 Thus, theirs may be a bargaining position that is
designed to extract more benefits from the negotiation process;
alternatively, the arguments may be disingenuous “makeweight” claims
supporting a case against renewables that is philosophically driven.
Unfortunately, merely pointing out their logical faults does not advance the
goal of achieving a national RPS very far. Presumably, the better hope of
securing the support of these senators and representatives lies in the
provision of additional benefits designed to compensate or mitigate the
costs of a national RPS to these regions.82
The prospects for a republican moment in support of a national RPS
may also be reduced by confusion over regulatory instruments. If a
national RPS is mainly about transitioning away from fossil fuels so as to
mitigate climate change, one might reasonably ask if an RPS is the best
way to achieve that objective. Professor Davies discusses the literature
critiquing RPSs on this ground, but he does not address head-on the claims
that we might better achieve that goal by promoting energy efficiency and
directly regulating greenhouse gas emissions. He does say that an RPS
“requires a more complete internalization of long-term externalities than
health-based pollution regulation,” because “politically-brokered emissions
standards” never fully internalize social costs.83 This answer seems
79

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Davies, supra note 3, at 1367–68, 1390–91.
81
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 126 (2009) (as
passed by House of Representatives, June 26, 2009).
82
This sort of bargaining seems to be behind the controversy over the Waxman-Markey bill’s
definition of “renewable biomass.” For environmental reasons, section 126 of the bill excludes from
the definition old growth trees and certain material taken from protected areas, such as wilderness
areas. Id. To the extent that legislative bargaining were to expand this definition, it might lead to
reductions in natural carbon sequestration by vegetation turned to biomass feedstock.
83
Davies, supra note 3, at 1394–95.
80
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insufficient because it seems to presume that politics waters down air
emissions regulation more than it does renewables policy. Professor
Davies’ vision of a national RPS, one that acts “like an off-ramp on a
highway” toward a clean energy future,84 will only become a reality
through the political process. That process may yield a national RPS that
is aspirational, with low salience distortion, and plenty of enforcement
rigor—or it may not. Indeed, we might speculate that the chances of
passage for a national RPS are directly proportional to its weaknesses, for
reasons outlined above. The Energy Information Administration predicts
fairly dire consequences for coal-fired power plants in the event of
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. This is understandable, and to be
expected, whether we achieve that goal using a national RPS or greenhouse
gas emissions regulations. Moving away from a carbon-based energy
system means shedding our cheapest sources of energy. That, in turn,
means an increase in electric rates.
3. Party and Ideology
Finally, there are two additional, and interrelated, differences between
the politics of energy reform in 2010 and the environmental politics of the
early 1970s. They have to do with party and ideology. At the time the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act were passed, both major political
parties claimed the mantle of environmental leadership. A Republican
president, Richard Nixon, signed into law both of these landmark
environmental statutes, having previously created the Environmental
Protection Agency through an executive reorganization plan.85 Indeed,
President George H.W. Bush, who signed the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments creating the acid rain program, ran for office claiming to be
“the environmental president.”86 We do not see that sort of bipartisanship
on environmental policy anymore. In addition, the environmental
legislation of the 1970s was part of a family of left-leaning social
movements, which included the civil rights movement, the consumer
movement, and the anti-war movement. The environmental movement
produced “republican moments” in Congress because the fervor and
energy of the general public was behind it. To members of Congress, the
issues seemed far more salient to those favoring regulation than to those
opposing it. That is not the case today. To the contrary, right-wing
populists who oppose federal regulation of the private sector seem to be the
modern analogues of the left-wing protesters of the 1960s and 1970s. To
84
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today’s members of Congress, environmental issues may seem far more
salient to those who oppose action than to those who favor it. All of this
further reduces the likelihood of Congress enacting a national RPS.87
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite all of this pessimism, it is worth remembering that there is a
persuasive case for a national RPS, one that Professor Davies makes
comprehensively and well. At times, his arguments seem a bit overstated,
but it is difficult to dispute his claim that a national RPS is far superior to a
system of state RPSs. Professor Davies’ analysis of state RPSs is a
welcome contribution to our understanding of energy policy. Like
Professor Davies, I find the purported benefits of state regulations to be
dwarfed by the costs and the defects of a patchwork system.
I have, however, taken issue with Professor Davies’ frustration and
wonderment at the fact that we continue to debate the merits of an RPS at
all. That debate, it seems to me, is perfectly understandable given the
political economy of energy and environmental policy in 2010. This is a
difficult issue for members of Congress. Even if they are inclined to
believe that the net present value of the benefits of a national RPS (in
averted environmental harm) outweighs the costs, they may reasonably
wonder whether the benefit-cost ratio is positive for their current
constituents. Proponents of a national RPS may not be able to overcome
this kind of resistance unless and until we experience the climate change
equivalent of the Cuyahoga River fire or a Santa Barbara oil spill:
catalyzing events that make the costs of inaction more immediate for most
voters. A depressing thought, perhaps, but one that points in two
directions. The first is toward the need to continue to study, measure, and
document the costs and benefits of moving toward a cleaner energy future,
so as to prepare for a future republican moment favoring a national RPS.
The second is toward the need to understand how we might adapt to
climate change, in the event that a republican moment never comes.

87
On the other hand, most of the ire directed at Congress over the Waxman-Markey and KerryBoxer bills seems aimed at greenhouse gas regulation. If greenhouse gas emissions regulation fails in
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Perhaps.

